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Asia and International Law—Common





From a conceptual viewpoint, the legal universe has found its almost perfect
configuration in our time. Almost all of the peoples of the world are members of the
United Nations and as such are entitled to co-operate in shaping the direction and
content of policies at the global level. Before World War II, and even a considerable time
after the horrendous events unleashed by that war, many nations had no say in
international matters. They were placed under colonial rule, which meant that their
voices were not heard—or heard only through the mediation of the powers that acted as
their wards and guardians. That situation of structural discrimination has changed
dramatically. All the peoples of the world have reached sovereign statehood and have
been admitted to the world forum.
From a conceptual viewpoint, the legal universe has found its almost perfect
configuration in our time. Almost all of the peoples of the world are members of the
United Nations and as such are entitled to co-operate in shaping the direction and
content of policies at the global level. Before World War II, and even a considerable
time after the horrendous events unleashed by that war, many nations had no say in
international matters. They were placed under colonial rule, which meant that their
voices were not heard—or heard only through the mediation of the powers that acted
as their wards and guardians. That situation of structural discrimination has changed
dramatically. All the peoples of the world have reached sovereign statehood and have
been admitted to the world forum. Even more, undeniably, the Asian group of
nations finds itself in a key position at the United Nations. Like the African group, it
counts fifty-three members, and one of these members, China, occupies a permanent
seat on the Security Council. Japan, on the other hand, has a fairly good chance to
also obtain a permanent seat in the near future.1 In other words, there is no trace
of any discrimination left—except, perhaps, for the stigmatization of Japan
* Emeritus Professor, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. Originally, this text was to be presented at
the First Research Convention of the Japan Chapter of the Asian Society of International Law in Tokyo
on 18 April 2010. Unfortunately, because of the eruption of the Icelandic volcano and the ensuing
interruption of air traffic in Europe, the author could not attend the meeting.
1. This is obviously an optimistic assessment.
(and also Germany) as a former ‘‘enemy state’’ under Article 53(2) of the UN Charter, a
characterization which has become obsolete and accordingly has lost any substantive
meaning.2 Thus, one may ask whether the assumed specificity of Asian perceptions of
international law has become a non-topic. It will be suggested that this is indeed partly
the case—but only partly, in some fields, and not in all fields of international law.
Before taking up the challenge, however, another preliminary observation may be
submitted. ‘‘Asia and International Law’’, the title words of this study, describe the
scope of the reflections to be deployed in an extremely wide fashion. According
to common knowledge, Asia constitutes a far less homogeneous unit than Europe.
Does Asia have any unity at all? It certainly cannot be subsumed under the concept
of ‘‘Third World’’, given the disparity of the state of development of its different
components. In the West, Asia starts at the doorstep of Europe with Turkey, a
country that does not really know whether its destiny is tied more to Europe or to
Asia,3 and after a long journey of almost nine thousand kilometres, Asia ends in
Japan. The countries of the Middle East are dominated by Islam; they have truly
specific societal features and constitute therefore a cultural universe of their own,
again with many internal variations, shades, and nuances. India, halfway between
the Mediterranean Middle East and the Pacific Far East, presents itself as a nation
with a highly complex mix of cultural and ethnic characteristics. Lastly, at the
Far-Eastern end of our journey, China and Japan have experienced development that
has moulded them as unique entities, each acquiring a profile with incomparable
peculiarities.4 Many other nations have also grown distinct identities. Therefore,
extreme caution is required in handling the concept of ‘‘Asia’’ or ‘‘Asian culture’’,
since any commentator might be unable even to identify the object referred to. In any
event, the complexity of the problématique shall not be ignored.
i. history of international law
Broad agreement exists among authors of international law that the modern concepts
of international law, as they are still being used today, had their origin in the European
world of the seventeenth century.5 This does not mean that in earlier centuries
there was a total lack of well-ordered relations among governmental entities, as
characterized by the conclusion of treaties and the exchange of ambassadors. Roberto
Ago, the former Italian judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), emphasized
2. According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (2005), references
to ‘‘enemy States’’ in arts. 53, 77, and 107 of the UN Charter should be deleted.
3. At the United Nations, Turkey participates fully in both the Western European and Others Group
(WEOG) and the Asian Group, but for electoral purposes is considered a member of WEOG only.
4. For David P. FIDLER, ‘‘The Asian Century: Implications for International Law’’ (2005) 9 Singapore Year
Book of International Law 19 at 25, Asia starts out in the West with India.
5. In the classic treatise by Lassa OPPENHEIM and Hersch LAUTERPACHT, International Law, 8th ed.,
Vol. I (London: Longmans, 1955) at 6, one can read that international law ‘‘is in its origin essentially a
product of Christian civilization, and began gradually to grow from the second half of the Middle Ages’’;
see also at 48. Similar statements have been made by Wilhelm G. GREWE, The Epochs of International
Law (Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 2000) at 9210; Henry WHEATON, Elements of International Law
with a Sketch of the History of the Subject (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, and Blanchard, 1836) at 22232.
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many times the co-existence of different civilizations around the Mediterranean Sea
after the Roman epoch.6 But the fine network of legal rules and concepts which still
serve as the anchors of the present-day system of international law saw its emergence
only after the Thirty Years War in Germany. Accordingly, the international system is
frequently called the ‘‘Westphalian’’ system, a name derived from the two cities of
Münster and Osnabrück where in 1648 the great peace treaties were signed. It is well
known that the European nations that dominated the world through their commercial
fleets and navies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not, during that
epoch, recognize the governmental entities that existed in Asia as states at the same
level of legal parity.7 After 1840, China was reduced by those powers to the status of a
semi-colonial country. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century could some
progress be observed. Japan entered into treaty relations with Western nations starting
in 1854,8 and the Ottoman Empire was admitted to that ‘‘club’’ in 1856. It is clear,
however, that the distance from the European system of international law did not
mean the total absence of legally regulated trans-boundary relationships. Onuma
Yasuaki has persuasively described the prevailing view of the Sino-centric world in
which the Europeans originally played only a marginal role as barbarians.9 In other
words, there existed over many centuries two different systems side by side, largely
ignoring one another.10
This parallelism can be seen as a sign of arrogance on the side of the Europeans,
who felt superior to all the other peoples of the world. However, another
interpretation is even more plausible. It may well be that the great seafaring
nations, the British, Dutch, and Portuguese, cultivated such a feeling of cultural
hegemony, trying deliberately to brush aside any legitimate claims of the kingdoms
and principalities in the Asian region, because full recognition as equals would have
hampered their strategies of conquest. As far as German legal literature is concerned,
it retained the terminology of ‘‘European international law’’ even during the first
half of the nineteenth century. The main reason for this terminological confinement
was nothing other than simple ignorance and parochialism. The authors who wrote
books on international law knew very little of the world beyond the boundaries
6. Roberto AGO, ‘‘Pluralism and the Origins of the International Community’’ (1977) 3 Italian Yearbook
of International Law 3 at 30. See also the condensed observations by Arthur NUSSBAUM, A Concise
History of the Law of Nations, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1954) at 6026.
7. Thus, in the Island of Palmas case, arbitrator Max Huber wrote that since ‘‘native princes or chiefs of
peoples [are] not recognized as members of the community of nations’’, contracts concluded by them
with states ‘‘are not, in the international law sense, treaties or conventions capable of creating rights and
obligations such as may, in international law, arise out of treaties’’. See Island of Palmas Case
(Netherlands/United States of America), Award of 4 April 1928, [1949] 2 RIAA 829 at 858. For a
modern interpretation of the status of pre-colonization governmental structures see the Western Sahara
case, Advisory Opinion, [1975] I.C.J. Rep.12 at 38240, 6328. See also Case Concerning Land and
Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea
Intervening), [2002] I.C.J. Rep. 303 at 40427.
8. Japan-United States Treaty of Amity and Friendship, 31 March 1854 (Kanagawa Convention).
9. ONUMA Yasuaki, ‘‘When was the Law of International Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of
International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective’’ (2000) 2 Journal of the History of
International Law 1 at 66.
10. See also ONUMA Yasuaki, A Transcivilizational Perspective on International Law (Leiden; Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) at 305214.
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of Europe. Thus, Johann Ludwig Klüber, explicitly mentioned by Onuma Yasuaki in
his impressive article about the origins of international law,11 has a little chapter on
‘‘The European States’’ in his 1821 treatise on ‘‘European International Law’’, where
he lists the existing European states one by one.12 It is quite obvious that the author
would not have been able to say anything about the states outside the geographical
area of Europe. Indeed, he does not even mention the United States. On the other
hand, twenty years later, August Wilhelm Heffter advanced another justification for
excluding the nations outside Europe from the scope of international law by arguing
that a guarantee of reciprocity was lacking in bilateral relations.13 Heffter’s argument
indeed smacks more of cultural superiority than the rather dry handling of the matter
by Klüber. In any event, however, before Germany reached its national unity in 1871,
the individual German states pursued only fairly modest colonial ambitions.14 The
Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Hamburg were mainly interested in finding reliable
partners in the world whenever their tradesmen established commercial contacts
with foreign countries. In sum, from a German viewpoint, the insistence on the
European character of international law was based on factual observations. From the
German perspective, inter-state relations did not take place across the oceans during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before the founding of the United States and
the emancipation of the Spanish colonies in Latin America. They were simply confined
to Europe ratione territorii. Only in the last decades of the nineteenth century did
‘‘transoceanic’’ international law become a living reality and be seriously analysed as a
challenge to traditional concepts of European superiority. When the independent
nations of the world came together for the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and
1907, European insularity had been definitively overcome.15
ii. the copernican revolution
However, this is not an inquiry into the history of international law. What matters is
the current position. Are there still any specificities that require us to consider the Asian
region, in whole or in part, as a region which has a special position under international
law? Is Asia different from Europe not only in terms of language, ethnicity, or customs,
but also in legal terms? Essentially the answer must be ‘‘no’’. The UN Charter brought
about a dramatic change in 1945 post World War II.16 After having fought a successful
11. Ibid., at 38.
12. Johann Ludwig KLÜBER, Europäisches Völkerrecht, Vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung, 1821)
at 59.
13. August Wilhelm HEFFTER, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (Berlin: Schroeder, 1844)
at 11.
14. The German state of Brandenburg-Prussia maintained from 1683 to 1717 the colony of Groß
Friedrichsburg in the territory of what is today Ghana.
15. Gustavo GOZZI, ‘‘History of International Law and Western Civilization’’ (2007) 9 International
Community Law Review 353 at 354265.
16. Rightly stressed by V.S. MANI, ‘‘Centrifugal and Centripetal Tendencies in the International System:
Some Reflections’’ in Ronald St. MACDONALD and Douglas M. JOHNSTON, eds., Towards World
Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden; Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff, 2005), 241 at 245.
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battle against military occupation and annexation as well as the inhuman treatment
of millions of human beings, the victorious powers could not possibly restore the
system as it had previously existed. Peace and human rights were incompatible with
discrimination and colonialism. Therefore, at San Francisco, sovereign equality—the
key concept of the new world order—was ushered in by the UN Charter in Article
2(1).17 Regarding non-self-governing territories and peoples still under foreign
domination, the Charter specified that the colonial powers would ‘‘develop self-
government, take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and assist them
in the progressive development of their free political institutions’’.18 Although this was
miles away from a straightforward recognition of the right of self-determination,19
it opened up the way for forward-looking developments. On the basis of the general
spirit of the Charter, the groundbreaking General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) was
adopted in 1960. It proclaimed that ‘‘all peoples have the right to self-determination’’.20
This programme was swiftly implemented and completed in the following years. It
came more or less to its close with the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa in
1994. In Asia, the former colonies of Hong Kong and Macao were reintegrated into
China as Special Administrative Regions in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Thus,
colonialism is a word of the past. It does not afflict the contemporary world.
A. Scrutiny of the Law of the Past
With the advent of new states, the traditional substance of international law had to
be scrutinized for unfair advantages to the Western powers. There was a general
feeling in the 1960s that a body of law that had been mainly created and practised by
the European nations could not be just towards the newcomers. The International
Law Commission (ILC) was one of the main bodies tasked with performing this
review. A first survey was carried out in 1949.21 However, it soon turned out that the
areas of legitimate dissatisfaction were more limited than originally anticipated. In
fact, the configuration at the time of the ‘‘classical’’ European international law was
not principally one that was marked by the polarity between the powerful European
nations and generally weaker colonial peoples and territories. It had accommodated
the varied relations among the European states. What seemed to be fair and adequate
17. Sovereignty has kept its de jure and de facto significance to this very day notwithstanding all the ongoing
integration processes at the international level. See Attila TANZI, ‘‘Remarks on Sovereignty in the
Evolving Constitutional Features of the International Community’’ in Mahnoush H. ARSANJANI,
Jacob Katz COGAN, Robert D. SLOANE, and Siegfried WEISSNER, eds., Looking to the Future:
Essays on International Law in Honour of W. Michael Reisman (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff,
2011), 299.
18. Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI [UN Charter], art. 73(b). See arts.
73–4 more generally.
19. The peoples under colonial domination were not recognized as interlocutors on a level of parity. All the
relevant decisions were left to the colonial powers. No deadline for the granting of independent
sovereignty was set.
20. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514 (XV),
UN Doc. A/4684 (1961).
21. See United Nations, eds., The Work of the International Law Commission, 7th ed., Vol. I (New York:
United Nations, 2007) at 33.
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in the relationships between European states was not necessarily inappropriate for
the relationships between European states and non-European states. In particular, the
principle of sovereign equality of states had an almost boundless potential of
emancipation and was of course readily and eagerly accepted by the countries of the
Third World as the basis of their new status in the world.22 Accordingly, not
everything that originated from a European-dominated world could be called
defective and be in need of reform. Instead, a careful scrutiny of the issues truly
deserving critique and subsequent transformation was necessary.
The basic axiom of pacta sunt servanda, a formal principle which may be presented
as the embodiment of justice itself, had many times been abused before World War II.
The fairness inherent in a treaty depends to a large extent on the distribution of factual
power between the contracting parties. The conclusion of ‘‘unequal treaties’’ was a
frequent occurrence in the nineteenth century. China in particular was many times
compelled to accept agreements that provided for unilateral advantages to the benefit of
the European party involved. As long as no account was taken of the factual inequality
of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the treaty concerned, a mighty nation
could dictate the conditions of the regime to be legally consolidated. In this regard, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) eventually clarified the legal
position. In consonance with the principle of non-use of force as articulated by Article
2(4) of the UN Charter, Article 52 of the Vienna Convention provides that treaties
procured by the threat or use of force are ‘‘void’’.23 Although there has never been
recourse to this ground of nullity,24 Article 52 has a tremendous symbolic and concrete
significance. Governments know that they are unable to obtain any advantages by
putting another state under undue pressure, such as the threat of military intervention.
Threats of all kinds have not ceased just for that reason, but international law does
maintain its moral integrity by denying legal validity to agreements extorted under such
conditions. The new spirit permeating international law has also brought about the
disappearance of all unequal treaties of the pre-United Nations era.25
Obviously, Article 52 applies to all classes of treaties, and therefore also to peace
treaties. When an armed conflict comes to its end, one encounters most of the time a
victorious party on one side and a defeated party on the other, except for instances
where peace is the result of exhaustion on both sides. For the victor, it is always
tempting to impose its will on the defeated party. In our time, the danger inherent in
this unequal configuration is less obvious than before the establishment of the United
Nations. In all matters of peace and security, the Security Council, under the mandate
22. Georges M. ABI-SAAB, ‘‘The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An
Outline’’ (1962) 8 Howard Law Journal 95 at 103 (‘‘the hard won prize of their long struggle for
emancipation’’). This still applies today. See, for instance, the praise of sovereignty by DUAN Jielong,
‘‘The Concept of the ‘Harmonious World’: An Important Contribution to International Relations’’ in
YEE Sienho and Jacques Yvan MORIN, eds., Multiculturalism and International Law: Essays in
Honour of Edward McWhinney (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 59 at 61.
23. See comments by Lucius CAFLISCH, ‘‘Unequal Treaties’’ (1992) 35 German Yearbook of International
Law 52 at 70277.
24. Olivier CORTEN, ‘‘Commentary on Art. 52 VCLT’’ in Olivier CORTEN and Pierre KLEIN, eds., Les
Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traités, Vol. II (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2006), 1867 at 1894.
25. But see the review of practice by Caflisch, supra note 23 at 60267.
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given to it by the UN Charter, is charged with a monitoring role.26 This again must be
called a major step in the right direction. It is well known that the Treaty of Versailles,27
which put a formal end to World War I, was inconsiderately imposed on Germany.
Germany was not admitted to the negotiations on its substance. Once the text was
finalized, Germany was provided, on 7 May 1919, with an opportunity to make
representations in writing. The German government availed itself of this opportunity
but almost nothing was changed. One month later, on 16 June 1919, Germany was
given an ultimatum to accept the Treaty within five days; otherwise military hostilities
would continue. On 22 June 1919, the German Reichstag adopted the Treaty and two
delegates of the Reichstag put their signature to the document on 28 June 1919.28 With
hindsight, one can say without any hesitation that this utter lack of regard for legitimate
German interests constituted the greatest diplomatic blunder of the entire twentieth
century. The unfairness of many of the clauses of the Treaty favoured the strengthening
of the extreme right wing of the political spectrum and laid the seeds for the coming to
power of Adolf Hitler and his criminal Nazi party. A nation having won an armed
conflict should never exploit its victorious situation. Fortunately, the VCLT has
acknowledged this basic requirement of justice and equity.
As far as customary international law is concerned, a comprehensive process of
review of the traditional rules has taken place through the United Nations. In this
process, it has turned out that the areas of concern were fairly limited. There could be
no doubt that the traditional breadth of the coastal territorial waters of only three
miles favoured the fishing fleets of the nations that had become engaged in fishing far
away from the coasts of their home countries. The general recognition of the
exclusive economic zone under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea rightly put an end to rules that were unfairly tilted in favour of such industrial
uses of the oceans.29 In addition, the traditional rules on the protection of foreign
investment, mainly framed by capital-exporting countries, could not remain
unchanged. The traditional Hull Rule, according to which compensation for
expropriation must be prompt, adequate, and effective,30 could not be maintained
since it would have prevented colonial countries from restructuring their national
economies after the end of foreign domination.31 It is significant that the Republic of
26. Taking into account the pitfalls inherent in art. 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it
has been preferred in recent times to impose the conditions of peace by a resolution of the Security
Council, the most important example in point being Resolution 687, UN Doc. S/RES/687 (1991) on
Iraq.
27. Of 28 June 1919, reprinted in: Wilhelm G. GREWE, ed., Fontes Historiae Iuris Gentium—Sources
Relating to the History of the Law of Nations, Vol. 3/2 (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992) at
683.
28. Christian TOMUSCHAT, ‘‘The 1871 Peace Treaty between France and Germany and the 1919 Peace
Treaty of Versailles’’ in Randall LESAFFER, ed., Peace Treaties and International Law in European
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 382 at 383.
29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into
force 10 September 1964), arts. 55–75.
30. See, for instance, Ian BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) at 509.
31. Whereas the radical contestation of the protection of foreign property by the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), UN Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (1974), art. 2(2)(c) found
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Guinea charged the Democratic Republic of the Congo with having unfairly deprived
one of its nationals of their possessions before the ICJ.32 Third World countries insist
that property legitimately acquired deserves legal guarantees. Diplomatic protection
with a view to defending the assets of nationals cannot be dismissed as a privilege of
a few powerful countries only.
Of course, the principle of sovereign equality does not do away with factual
inequalities. Liechtenstein will never have the same stature as China or the United
States, nor will Chad ever have a decisive say in international politics. The world
economic system has been shaped by the large industrialized states and it cannot be
denied that many Third World countries are lagging far behind.33 Without any
persuasive justification, however, some authors have decried sovereign equality as a
fiction without any real substance. Such critique has become a leitmotif of the
movement known as ‘‘Third World Approaches to International Law’’ (TWAIL).34 One
of the guiding manifestations of this movement is a statement made by Makau Mutua
on the occasion of the 94th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law in 2000 where, in a fierce attack on international law in its entirety, he declared:
‘‘The regime of international law is illegitimate. It is a predatory system that legitimizes,
reproduces and sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the
West’’, and categorized those voices from the Third World that supported the existing
world order system as ‘‘collaborationalist intellectuals [of a] betrayal class’’.35
Such criticism36 would appear to be short-sighted and out of touch with reality.37
The point of international law is that even a small state is protected by the principles
of non-use of force and non-intervention, that it may participate in the work of the
United Nations, and that it enjoys treaty-making power as well as the legal
advantages that flow from sovereignty, in particular, immunity. On the other hand,
the powerful states, apart from their privileged position as permanent members of
the Security Council, have no more rights and no more extensive rights than even the
micro-states. In the global order, the United States and China are not better protected
by the law than the other members of the United Nations. On the other hand, power
no general international recognition, the compromised formula embodied in Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources, GA Res. 1803 (XVII), UN Doc. A/5217 (1962), has provided guidance to
international practice.
32. Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of Congo),
Judgment of 30 November 2010, online: ICJ /www.icj-cij.orgS. (Concluding that the Respondent had
not violated any of the pecuniary interests of the Guinean citizen involved, the ICJ had no need to
express itself on the guarantee of private assets under general international law.)
33. The de facto existing economic disparity is one of the main criticisms voiced by B.S. CHIMNI,
‘‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’’ (2006) 8 International Community Law
Review 3.
34. See, for instance, David KENNEDY, ‘‘The TWAIL Conference: Keynote Address’’ (2007) 9 International
Community Law Review 333 at 335, 338.
35. Makau MUTUA, ‘‘What is TWAIL?’’ (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 31.
36. Another one of the basic texts has been authored by Chimni, supra note 33. On the history of this
movement see Karin MICKELSON, ‘‘Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories’’ (2008) 10 International
Community Law Review 355.
37. For a persuasive rejection of such criticisms, see Marcelo G. KOHEN, ‘‘Commentary on Art. 2(1) UN
Charter’’ in Jean-Pierrre COT, Alain PELLET, and Mathias FORTEAU, eds., La Charte des Nations
Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed. (Paris: Economica, 2005), 399.
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does affect the reach of law. After the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, it seemed
for a moment that the Western superpower could establish itself as the hegemon of
the world. Only a few years later, the international community now notes that in
terms of economic and military power the United States and China are factually
located at a level of parity. No political analyst would subscribe to the concept of a
unipolar world any longer. In this regard, sovereign equality has kept its paramount
importance also for the United States as a country which in the near future may have
to share its place at the top with other states.38
Rejection of the World Trade Organization (WTO) system of international
commercial relations and other economic and financial mechanisms cannot be the
panacea for curing the deepening gap between rich and poor nations.39 One must
certainly agree with the adherents of TWAIL that the practical effects of those systems
must continually be kept under strict supervision. It is obvious that the distribution of
wealth generated by the world economy produces from time to time results that are
outright scandalous.40 Poverty is and remains one of the major challenges the
international community has to address, as explicitly recognized by the United Nations
Millennium Declaration.41 On the other hand, the liberalization of international trade
has created massive employment precisely in many less-developed countries, China and
India being the main cases in point. It must also be observed that most states adhere to
treaties of their own free will. On the strength of their membership, they are able to
press not only for superficial changes but even for fundamental reforms.42 In any event,
the rules of general international law are not tainted by any structural deficiency. As far
as the relevant treaty regimes are concerned, there is certainly room for improvement,
which can be obtained through hard processes of negotiation. It should be added that
increasingly Western nations, too, feel the pressures of global markets which do not
fluctuate under commands given to them.43
B. Asian Participation in Legal Activities
A close glance at international practice shows that Asian states have effectively made
use of the international legal space. As far as law-making is concerned, attention may
be focused on the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,44 an
38. See comment by Christian TOMUSCHAT, ‘‘Multilateralism in the Age of US Hegemony’’ in MacDonald
and Johnston, eds., supra note 16 at 31275.
39. See criticism by B.S. CHIMNI, ‘‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the
Making’’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 1 at 729.
40. See Obiora Chinedu OKAFOR, ‘‘Poverty, Agency and Resistance in the Future of International Law in
an African Perspective’’ in Richard FALK, Jacqueline STEVENS, and Balakrishnan RAJAGOPAL, eds.,
International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 95.
41. United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res. 55/2, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000).
42. For a sober analysis of the achievements of Third World countries see David P. FIDLER, ‘‘Revolt Against
or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World and the Future Direction of International
Law’’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 29 at 38256.
43. See Christian TOMUSCHAT, ‘‘Word Order Models: A Disputation with B.S. Chimni and Yasuaki
Onuma’’ (2006) 8 International Community Law Review 71.
44. Adopted by Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States, GA Res. 37/10, UN Doc. A/RES/37/10
(1982).
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initiative of the non-aligned countries, where Asian members played a leading role.
Great contributions have continually been made by the Asian-African Legal
Consultative Organization, which since its inception has successfully attempted to
keep a vigilant eye on the work of the ILC.45 It should also be recalled that the
codification of jurisdictional immunities of states, which culminated in 2004 with
the adoption of a convention,46 had been entrusted in the ILC to two special
rapporteurs from Asia—initially Sompong Sucharitkul, who was then followed by
Motoo Ogiso. Regarding the complex topic of ‘‘International liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law’’, Sreenivasa
Rao from India led the ILC to a concrete result after a protracted period of
discussion.47 In sum, the contribution of Asia to the law review process of the post-
colonial period has left its indelible hallmark on the body of international law. Asia
cannot any longer be called an outsider. It has become one of the most active
supporters of international law.
The same can be said of Asia’s participation in international adjudication.48 As one
of the five permanent members of the Security Council, China has for most of the
time had a judge at the ICJ.49 Even more conspicuous is Japan’s achievement. Oda
Shigeru, obviously enjoying to an astounding degree the confidence of the international
community, served as a judge for three consecutive terms, from 1976 to 2003. Rightly,
his extraordinary merits were honoured by an extremely rich two-volume Festschrift in
2002.50 His successor, Owada Hisashi, was entrusted by his colleagues with the office of
President of the Court after the departure of Rosalyn Higgins. Shi Jiuyong, Nagendra
Singh, R.S. Pathak, and C.G. Weeramantry also count among the prominent judges of
the Court whose opinions have shown new orientations in an interdependent world of
solidarity and co-operation. Hence, Asia has also been able to position itself at the
forefront of developments in the field of international adjudication.
In sum, the conclusion of the preceding observations is that Asia can today be
considered as being fully integrated in the system of the traditional rules of inter-state
law.51 One might even say that a country like Japan counts among the staunchest
supporters of that body of law which, under the auspices of sovereign equality, has
removed any vestiges of historical alienation. Modern international law provides an
appropriate framework for the full enjoyment of the exercise of self-determination.
On the other hand, most Asian states, and Japan in particular, are also prepared
45. The adoption of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, GA Res. 2312(XXII), 14 December 1967, is
largely owed to its efforts.
46. United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, GA Res. 59/38,
UN Doc A/59/508 (2004).
47. See Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous
Activities, taken note of by GA Res. 61/36, UN Doc. A/61/PV.64 (2006).
48. An excellent overview is given by OWADA Hisashi, ‘‘The Experience of Asia with International
Adjudication’’ (2005) 9 Singapore Year Book of International Law 9.
49. There was an interruption between 1967 and 1985.
50. ANDO Nisuke, Edward MCWHINNEY, and Rüdiger WOLFRUM, eds., Liber Amicorum Judge
Shigeru Oda (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002).
51. I agree with Saeid MIRZAEE-YENGEJEH, ‘‘International Law as a Cultural Perspective: Towards a
Convergence of Civilizations’’ in MacDonald and Johnston, eds., supra note 16 at 191.
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to extend a helping hand to economically weaker nations. After the United States, Japan
is the second largest contributor to the budget of the United Nations, and its share in
financing initiatives for the development of Third World countries is also impressive.
iii. human rights
There is one field of modern international law where a global assessment encounters
many more difficulties. Human rights entered international law at a relatively late
date. Before World War II, the prevailing opinion was that individuals were subject
to the jurisdiction of their national governments and that third states lacked any
justification for intervening in that relationship. The atrocities committed during
World War II convinced the international community to abandon this traditional
view. The UN Charter elevated ‘‘promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms’’ to the rank of one of the primary purposes of
the world organization.52 Human rights have steadily gained ground since. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted on 10 December 194853—with
the active support of no less than twelve Asian countries54—and in 1993 the World
Conference on Human Rights determined that ‘‘the promotion and protection of all
human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community’’.55 More
recently, the World Summit Outcome of 2005, adopted by consensus, again renewed
the commitment of the international community to human rights.56
In sum, at first glance, everything seems to be in full harmony. All states profess
their respect of human rights, and almost no reservations are expressed at the level of
declarations that have a primarily political character. However, one should not be
misled by superficial appearances. States are very sensitive to human rights because
they do not stop at their outer limits. According to a classical saying, within the
system of traditional international law states interact like billiard balls, touching one
another only at their surface.57 Human rights cannot be squeezed into this model.
They make requests on the internal order of states, directing them to organize their
governmental structures in specific ways. Thus, human rights stand virtually in
contrast to the principle of self-determination. The autonomy gained by sovereign
equality, the basis of which is democratic self-determination, is immediately
restricted by requirements following from international human rights law. And
the scope of matters for which governments can be made accountable by the
international community under the profile of human rights becomes extremely wide.
52. UN Charter, supra note 18, art. 1(3).
53. Among the most influential members of the Commission on Human Rights were Charles Malik from
Lebanon and Hansa Mehta from India.
54. Afghanistan, Burma, China, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Syria, and
Turkey. Saudi Arabia abstained from voting.
55. High Commissioner for the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, GA Res. 48/141, UN Doc.
A/Res/48/141 (1993), para. 3(a).
56. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 2, paras. 119–45.
57. This is the classic realist metaphor first used by Arnold Wolfers. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and
Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962) at 19224.
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Human rights cover almost all fields of governmental activity. Wherever decisions are
taken that in some way or other affect individual human beings, human rights
invariably come into play.
This configuration can be seen in two different ways. On the one hand, one may
emphasize the negative aspects, such as the loss of national freedom of action.58 On
the other hand, the prevailing view is that indeed the international community must
have a right of supervision vis-à-vis political systems in which not infrequently the
ruling elites do not at all represent the aspirations of their peoples or where from time
to time the internal checks and balances break down, leaving individual human
beings defenceless against mighty executive power structures.
Some of the discrepancies that have arisen in the field of human rights are hardly
concealed by the actors involved. To date, China has abstained from ratifying the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),59 and it is more or less
compelled to distance itself from that instrument as long as it maintains its official
ideology according to which the Communist Party is the leading political group of a
country which does not tolerate any competitors.60 Under the present conditions,
acceptance of the ICCPR could not be seen as a serious gesture and would rather
delegitimize the Covenant, given the obvious tensions between the principle of non-
discrimination on political grounds in Article 2(1) and the authoritarian structure of
the Chinese Constitution.61 From the group of Islamic countries, too, some have quite
deliberately remained aloof from the Covenant, of which they reject two basic
components: the principle of equality between men and women and the freedom of
religious faith. Numerous reservations characterize their ratifications of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child; mostly, the precedence to be granted
to the teachings of the Koran is stressed in those reservations.62 It is clear that the
often proclaimed universality of human rights, the centrepiece of the human rights
idea, according to which human rights accrue to every human being by virtue of the
sole fact that they constitute the basic requirements of a life in dignity, undergoes a
58. This seems to be a view widely held by Asian governments, see YEE Sienho, ‘‘The Role of Law in the
Formation of Regional Perspectives in Human Rights and Regional Systems for the Protection of Human
Rights: The European and Asian Models as Illustration’’ (2004) 8 Singapore Year Book of International
Law 157 at 163. See also observations by Antony ANGHIE, ‘‘The Evolution of International Law:
Colonial and Postcolonial Realities’’ in Richard FALK et al., eds., supra note 40 at 45.
59. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), UN
Doc. A/6316 (entered into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR].
60. Compare Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 4 December 1982, art. 1 and ICCPR, ibid.
61. Unfortunately, when China was reviewed under the UN procedure of Universal Periodic Review in
February 2009, it rejected all suggestions to ensure the independence of the judiciary and to take care
that lawyers could defend their clients without fear of harassment. On the other hand, it accepted a
suggestion by Cuba to ‘‘avoid the impunity for people who are qualifying themselves as human rights
defenders with the objective of attacking the interests of the state and the people of China’’; see Report of
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/25(2009), at para.
114, section 34.
62. For recent studies on the Islamic concept of human rights, see e.g., Mashood A. BADERIN,
International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Syed Jafar
ALAM, ‘‘Towards a New Discourse: Human Rights in Islam and Vice Versa’’ (2007) 47 Indian Journal
of International Law 257, 262ff.
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hard test in the face of such realities. On the other hand, India, as well as the ASEAN
countries,63 seems to have joined the mainstream view of human rights.64
In the preparatory stages of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, an
attempt had been made to sort out the difficulties impeding the acceptance of the
concept of the universality of human rights by establishing a common denominator
through dialogue and negotiation.
The Asia countries met for such a preparatory meeting in Bangkok from 29 March
to 2 April 1993. Regarding the concept of universality, the following proposition was
adopted:
That while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context
of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and
religious backgrounds.65
This formulation also found its way in a slightly amended fashion into the 2005
World Summit Outcome:
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, all States, regardless of the
political, economic and cultural systems, have the duty to promote and protect all
human rights and fundamental freedoms.66
These statements may be interpreted as a trivial acknowledgement of the fact that
human rights will have to be accommodated in the most diverse contexts from which
they will unavoidably be influenced. On the other hand, they might also be used as a
pretext to relativize firm conventional obligations undertaken under any of the
human rights treaties. In this regard, the writer notes that the Bangkok Declaration
grants more leeway to states than the corresponding clause of the World Summit
Outcome, which hastens to stress that the relevant political, economic, and cultural
system of a country does not open up uncontrollable margins of appreciation.
In this connection, the question of specific ‘‘Asian values’’ arises as well. Does Asia in
general keep some distance from individual rights, favouring instead the concept of
duties to be complied with by everyone, by individuals as well as by governments?67 On
this issue, there seems to be a gap between governments and NGOs, which view the
63. In 2009, during the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, or
AICHR, was inaugurated and launched in Cha-am, Hua Hin, Thailand. The basic parameters of the
AICHR seem to be the human rights as conceived of at the universal level.
64. See e.g., Rahmatullah KHAN, ‘‘Universality of Human Rights’’ in R.K. DIXIT et al., eds., International
Law: Issues and Challenges, Vol. II (New Delhi: Indian Society of International Law, 2010), 315 at 316.
65. Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc.
A/CONF.157/PC/59 (1993), para. 8 [Bangkok Declaration]. For a cogent political analysis of this
Declaration, see Michael C. DAVIS, ‘‘Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bangkok Declaration’’
(199526) 2 Buffalo Journal of International Law 215.
66. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 2, para. 121.
67. Famous is the letter written by Mahatma Gandhi on 25 May 1947 to the then Director-General of
UNESCO, Julian Huxley, where he stated: ‘‘I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to
be deserved and preserved came from duty well done.’’ See UNESCO, Human Rights Teaching, Vol. IV
(Paris: UNESCO, 1985) at 4.
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states’ insistence on the concept of duties more as a pretext than as a true philosophical
position.68 In any event, like all the other continents, Asia needs to protect the rights of
the individual.69 And it would seem to be a vain undertaking to roll back the wheel of
history. The notion of human rights cannot be made to disappear. The only—and
eternal—question is how to find an adequate balance between individual rights and
freedoms and the requirements of the common interest.
In any event, for a lawyer it is indispensable to take a clear stance. The ‘‘trivial’’
interpretation of the relevant clauses of the two human rights declarations of 1993
and 2005 cannot be called into question.70 It would be self-defeating to deny that
human beings have to lead their lives under the most diverse circumstances. But
human rights treaties would be essentially undermined if their substance was
unconditionally subordinated to widely differing historical, cultural, and religious
circumstances. It is simply an error to believe that traditions are necessarily good,
deserving to be kept. Human rights derive their legitimacy from ideas of
enlightenment which acknowledge the value and dignity of the individual human
being. Equality and non-discrimination belong to the central pillars of the entire
edifice of human rights. Therefore, to deny women full equality in their status as
citizens and as actors in civil life cannot be justified any longer if a state has ratified
the ICCPR; it is debarred from invoking the Bangkok Declaration to support
treatment to that effect. Slavery, the burning of widows, or female genital mutilation
are practices which deny the dignity of others.71
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that not all Western trends and fashions
partake of the minimum consensus supporting the human rights concept. From the
very outset, the assumption that human rights is a Western concept was erroneous.72
Western countries had undeniably an edge in formulating specific requests opposed
to governments as legal entitlements. The relevant examples are all well known: the
1776 Virginia Bill of Rights, the 1789 French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et
du citoyen, and the American Bill of Rights of 1789 and 1791. But this does not
indicate a black hole in places where no similar efforts were made to synthesize
citizens’ basic entitlements in one comprehensive instrument. Whenever human
beings come together to found a common polity, the rights and duties of the rulers
and the ruled must be defined and circumscribed. From its specific experiences,
every human community can make a contribution to a standard applicable to all.
68. For a vigorous critique of governmental positions on this issue, see Yash GHAI, ‘‘Human Rights and
Governance: The Asia Debate’’ (1994) 15 Australian Yearbook of International Law 1.
69. A drastic picture of the lack of human rights protections in many Asian countries is given by Annapurna
WAUGHRAY, ‘‘Human Rights in South Asia: Abuse and Degradation’’ (2001) 10 Asian Yearbook of
International Law 25.
70. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 65; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference
on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993) [Vienna Declaration].
71. Khan, supra note 64 at 317, has reported that in Tungana v. His Majesty’s Government, the Nepal
Supreme Court referred to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women when ruling that sexual intercourse without the consent of the partner could amount to rape.
72. Christian TOMUSCHAT, ‘‘Human Rights in a World-Wide Framework: Some Current Issues’’ (1985)
45 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 547 at 550; Christian TOMUSCHAT, Human Rights:
Between Idealism and Realism, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 85 (rejecting the
assumption that human rights is a Western concept).
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This intercivilizational method has rightly been advocated as providing the common
ground susceptible of being affirmed by all nations.73 Such commonality should not
be endangered by excessive demands. It is a matter of common knowledge that, in
particular, serious controversies have arisen in connection with sexual practices. In
this regard, each society has to find the right balance for itself. It amounts to Western
arrogance to contend that non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
constitutes a universal principle. Asian countries do not seem to have found uniform
solutions either. Activists may propagate the views which they feel to be correct and
desirable. But they should not invoke for their political purposes the authority of
international treaties which have refrained from addressing this delicate issue.
iv. concluding observations
Asia and international law is a topic much too vast to be satisfactorily addressed in a
short article that was originally designed as a conference presentation. Only a few
perspectives could be demarcated. Lastly, one should be aware of the fact that no
human community is an eternally stable unit. All human communities interact with
one another. In our time, no group is hermetically secluded from the outside world.
Through the manifold processes of interaction, human communities and their
members change in the course of time, assuming new features and abandoning old
habits.74 Additionally, as Onuma Yasuaki has rightly pointed out, in our time human
beings have the unique chance to develop several identities. Nobody is only the citizen
of his or her country, like an obedient soldier.75 Accordingly, collective identities also
change faster and more extensively than ever before in human history. Human
communities are not immovable granite blocks. In trying to find the right answers to
newly emerging problems, one should always be conscious of this dynamism which
often makes traditional answers unsuitable for the challenges of our time.76
73. See Onuma, supra note 10 at 432262.
74. Rightly underlined by Ghai, supra note 68 at 6, 21.
75. ONUMAYasuaki, ‘‘A Transcivilizational Perspective on Global Legal Order in the Twenty-first Century:
A Way to Overcome West-centric and Judiciary-centric Deficits in International Legal Thoughts’’ in
MacDonald and Johnston, eds., supra note 16, 151 at 162.
76. Thus, Fidler, supra note 4 at 19235 reflects on new governmental structures for Asia in the form of a
‘‘Concert of Asia’’.
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